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Abstract? This? work? is? focused? on? the? problem? of?
performing? multi?robot? patrolling? for? infrastructure?
security? applications? in? order? to? protect? a? known?
environment? at? critical? facilities.? Thus,? given? a? set? of?
robots? and? a? set? of? points? of? interest,? the? patrolling?
task? consists? of? constantly? visiting? these? points? at?
irregular? time? intervals? for?security?purposes.?Current?
existing? solutions? for? these? types? of? applications? are?
predictable? and? inflexible.? Moreover,? most? of? the?
previous?work?has?tackled?the?patrolling?problem?with?
centralized? and? deterministic? solutions? and? only? few?
efforts?have?been?made?to? integrate?dynamic?methods.??
Therefore,?one?of?the?main?contributions?of?this?work?is?
the? development? of? new? dynamic? and? decentralized?
collaborative? approaches? in? order? to? solve? the?
aforementioned? problem? by? implementing? learning?
models? from?Game?Theory.?The?model? selected? in? this?
work? that? includes? belief?based? and? reinforcement?
models? as? special? cases? is? called? Experience?Weighted?
Attraction.? The? problem? has? been? defined? using?
concepts?of?Graph?Theory?to?represent?the?environment?
in? order? to? work? with? such? Game? Theory? techniques.?
Finally,? the? proposed? methods? have? been? evaluated?
experimentally? by? using? a? patrolling? simulator.? The?
results? obtained? have? been? compared? with? previous?
available?approaches.?
Keywords? Multi?Robot? Patrolling,? Game? Theory,?
Experience?Weighted?Attraction,?Security?Application?
?
1.?Introduction?
Domains,? where? distributed? surveillance,? inspection? or?
control?are?required,?are?candidates?for?being?secured?by?
performing? patrolling? tasks,? usually? by? walking?
throughout?at?regular?intervals?(Abate,?1996),?(Almeida?et?
al.,?2004).?Currently,?security?system?solutions?are?mostly?
predictable? and? inflexible.?Additionally,? since? they? are?
controlled? by? human? operators,? their? performance? can?
be? affected? by? limitations? such? as? boredom,? distraction,?
or? fatigue.?Furthermore,? in? some? environments,? people?
must?deal?with?hazardous?conditions.?As?a?consequence,?
it? is? important? to? improve? the? security?elements?used? in?
these? types? of? systems,? which? assist? human? beings? in?
dangerous?scenarios?such?as?mine?clearing?or?search?and?
rescue? operations.? They? are? then? able? to? perform? other?
type?of?high? level?tasks,? i.e.,?monitoring?the?system? from?
a? safe? location? (Oates? et? al.,? 2009).? ? Recently,? new?
research? efforts? have? arisen? trying? to? solve? some?
challenges?related? to? security? tasks?automation?by?using?
mobile?robots?(Everett,?2003).??Thus,?mobile?robots?aim?to?
perform?some?useful?task? that?a?human?either?cannot,?or?
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would? prefer? not? to? do.? Moreover,? the? robot? should?
hopefully?do?it?better,?cheaper,?safer,?and?more?reliably.?
Security? systems? that? utilize? mobile? robots? in? these?
types? of? applications? have? a? great? deal? of? advantages,?
i.e.,? they? do? not? experience? human? limitations.???
However,? some? tasks? are?too?complex?that?a?single?robot?
cannot?achieve?good?results,?especially?in?the?presence?of?
uncertainties,? incomplete? information,? distributed?
control,? and? so? forth.? ? To? overcome? these? challenges,?
Multi?Robot?Systems?can?be?used.? They?are? characterized?
as? a? set? of? homogeneous? or? heterogeneous? robots?
operating? in? the? same? environment? using? cooperative?
behaviors?(Farinelli?et?al.,?2004).?
?
In?this?paper,?new?collaborative?multi?robot?approaches?for?
infrastructure? security? applications? at? critical? facilities? are?
explored.? The? work? is? focused? on? area? patrol,? i.e.,? the?
activity?of?going?throughout?an?area.???Thus,?given?a?set?of?
robots?and?a?set?of?points?of?interest,?the?patrolling?problem?
consists?of?constantly?visiting?these?points?at?irregular?time?
intervals? for? security? purposes.? This? problem? has? been?
formulated?using?concepts?of?Graph?Theory?to?represent?an?
environment? where? nodes? stand? for? specific? location? of?
interest? and? edges? for? possible? paths.? By? using? this?
representation,?each?path?has?a?cost?that?represents?the?time?
required? to? go? from? one? node? to? another.? The? main?
advantage?of?this?representation?is?its?application.?It?can?be?
easily? used? in? other? domains,? i.e.,? computer? networks,?
distributed?coverage,?and?so?forth.???Additionally,?there?is?a?
wide? variety? of? problems? that? may? be? reformulated? as?
particular?patrolling? task?such?as?cleaning?or?surveillance.?
Since?the?patrolling?problem?seeks?to?maximize?the?number?
of? visits? to? each? node? in? a? given? environment,? a? good?
patrolling?strategy?must?reduce? the? time? lag?between? two?
visits?to?the?same?location?(Chevaleyre,?2004).?
?
The?main? contributions?of? this?work? are? summarized?as?
follows:? An? analysis? of? the? behavior? of? game? theory?
models? in? the? multi?robot?patrolling?problem? context? is?
presented.?A?dynamic? and?distributed?solution?has?been?
developed?in?order?to?solve?the?aforementioned?problem.?
A? novel? decision?making? rule? has? been? defined.? This?
rule? attempts? to? allow? robot? dispersion,? i.e.,? at? each?
point? of? interest,? each? robot? chooses? a? different?
available? set? of? actions.? A? demonstration? of? how?
multiple? robot? interaction? arises? with? the? definition? of?
multiple?games?at?each?point?of? interest?has?been?defied.??
Finally,? a? detailed? study? of? the? behavior? of? the?
implemented?model?parameters?has?been?described.?
?
The? rest? of? this?paper? is? organized?as? follows.?Section? 2?
briefly? describes? related? work.? Section? 3? gives?
definitions?of? game? theory? and? introduces? the? problem.?
Section? 4? shows? the? implemented? models? in? order? to?
solve? the? patrolling? problem.? Section? 5? presents? the?
evaluation? and? experimental? results.? Finally,? section? 6?
summarizes?the?obtained?results.?
2.?Related?work?
The?multi?robot?patrolling?problem?has?received?much?
attention? in? recent? years,? specially? in? works? that?
develop? algorithms? to? coordinate? decision?making?
among? robots,? (Portugal? and? Rocha,? 2011).? These?
works? have? implemented? different? principles? such? as?
reinforcement? learning? (Santana? et? al.,? 2004);?
negotiations? methods? (Hwang,? 2009);? swarm?
optimization? (Glad? and? Buffet,? 2009);? cycle? and?
partitioning? strategies? (Chevaleyre,? 2004);? and?
adaptive? solutions? (Sempé? and? Drogoul,? 2003).? A?
description? of? all? of? them? can? be? found? on? a? recent?
survey? by? (Portugal? and? Rocha,? 2011).? Beyond? this?
survey,?the?multi?robot?patrolling?problem?was?tackled?
in? (Ahmadi? and? Stone,? 2006).? ? In? that? work,? the?
problem?was?called?Continuous?Area?Sweeping,?which?is?
solved?with? a?partitioning? area?method.?Moreover,? in?
(Aguirre? et? al.,? 2011),? the? multi?robot? patrolling? is?
applied? to? patrol? national? borders.? In? that? work,?
elements? of? game? theory? as? well? as? Monte? Carlo?
simulation? are? used? to? solve? the? problem? via? genetic?
algorithms.? Another? work? that? utilizes? game? theory?
principles? is? described? in? (An? et? al.,? 2012).? In? that?
work,? solutions? to? solve? competitive? or? zero?sum?
games? for? the? protection? of? critical? infrastructure? via?
Stackelberg?Games?are?presented.?
?
Among?all?these?works,?three?of?them?are?directly?related?
with? this? work.? The? pioneer? work? in? the? multi?robot?
patrolling?problem?was? carried? out? by? (Machado? et? al.,?
2003).? In? that? work,? authors? defined? an? evaluation?
criterion? based? on? idleness.? ? Idleness? is? the? time? that? a?
place?remains?unvisited.??Thus,?Total?Idleness?is?defined?as?
the? average? of? the? idleness? of? all? places? of? a? given?
environment.? ? Since? this? criterion? is? widely? used? in?
literature,? it?was?used?to?measure?the?performance?of?the?
methods?proposed? in? this?work.? ?Moreover,? the?problem?
of? generating? a? patrol? path? inside? a? target? area? was?
tackled?in?(Elmaliach?et?al.,?2007).??The?algorithm? applied?
to? generate? this? patrol? path? is? called? Cycle? and? it?
guarantees? that? each? point? is? covered? with? the? same?
optimal? frequency.? The? solution?presented? in? that?work?
uses?Spanning?Tree?Coverage?method? to? find?a?minimal?
Hamilton?path?of?minimal?costs.? Once?a?path?is?obtained,?
robots? are? uniformly? distributed? along? this? path? and?
follow? the? same? patrol? route? over? and? over.? Thus,?
uniform? frequency? of? the? multi?robot? patrolling? task? is?
achieved? as? long? as? one? robot? continues? working?
properly.? ? Moreover,? authors? present? criteria? based? on?
frequency? optimization? in? order? to? evaluate?multi?robot?
patrolling? algorithms.? Finally,? in? (Portugal? and? Rocha,?
2010)? is? presented? an? algorithm? called? MPS.? Such? an?
algorithm?divides? the?environment? into?regions?with? the?
same?dimension?by?using?a?balanced?graph?partitioning?
approach.? Each? of? these? regions? is? assigned? to? a? robot?
that? follows? a? local? patrolling? route.? The? procedure? to?
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obtain? this? patrolling? route? mainly? seeks? Euler? and?
Hamilton? circuits? and? paths.? ? However,? if? such? circuits?
and?paths?do?not?exist,?the?procedure?seeks?longest?paths?
and? Non?Hamiltonian? cycles.? ? Non?Hamiltonian? cycles?
are? selected? only? when? they? have? at? least? half? of? the?
vertices?of?a?graph;?if?not,?the?patrolling?route?remains?the?
longest? path.? Since? the? longest? path? and? the? Non?
Hamiltonian? cycle? do? not? contain? all? vertices? of? the?
graph,? the?procedure? includes? such?vertices? to? complete?
the? patrolling? route.? ? Then,? ultimately? inverse? path?
procedure? is?used? to? return? to? the? starting?vertex?of? the?
route?when?is?required.?
?
Previous? literature?has?demonstrated?the?effectiveness?of?
methods? that? implement? solutions? based? on? cycles? and?
paths?(Chevaleyre,?2004).??The?good?performance?of?these?
approaches? could? be? explained?by? their? centralized?and?
explicit? coordinator? scheme,? (Almeida? et? al.,? 2004).?
However,? a? centralized? solution? has? several?
disadvantages?such?as?lack?of?scalability?in?the?number?of?
places?to?protect?and?susceptibility?to?single?point?failure,?
due? to? its?unique,?and?hence?vulnerable,?control?point.?In?
addition,?these?approaches?are?deterministic,?and?therefore?
not? suitable? for? security? purposes? due? to? their?
predictability.?
?
The?present?work?differs?from?others?on?the?manner?in?
which? the? patrolling? problem? was? solved? by?
implementing? learning?models? from?Game?Theory.?The?
theory?of? learning? in?games?defines?equilibrium?as?the?
result? of? dynamic? adjustment? processes? in? which?
players? interact? for? optimality? over? time? in? repeated?
normal?form?games.? ?Thus,? they?compute? their?myopic?
best? response? based? on? the? accumulated? experience?
achieved? by? tracking? previous? plays? history? of? other?
players.? The? learning? model? selected? in? this? work? to?
patrol? throughout? an? environment? was? proposed? by?
Camerer? and? is? called? Experience?Weighted? Attraction?
(Camerer,? 1999).? Implementing? such? adaptive?models?
allows? developing? dynamic? and? distributed? solutions?
similar? to? (Santana? et? al.,? 2004)? in? contrast? to? several?
literature?works.?
3.?Concepts?from?game?theory?
A?brief?overview?of?concepts?as?well?as?some?definitions?
of? game? theory? (Fudenberg,? 1998)? are?given? in?order? to?
clarify? the? description? in? the? following? sections.? In? this?
work,?an?abstract?representation?of?the?environment?as?an?
undirected? weighted? graphG has? been? adopted.? This?
graph? is? an? ordered? pair? consisting? of? a? set ? ?E G of?
edges? and? a? set ? ?N G of? nodes.? Each?node? is? a? special?
point? of? interest? that? needs? to? be? observed? in? search? of?
intruders,? but? it? is? assumed? that? such? observation? is?
instantaneous.? ?Each? edge? represents? a? path? by? using? a?
number? corresponding? to? the? cost? proportional? to? its?
length.?
Thus,? given? such? graph? and? a? set? of? robots,? the?
patrolling? task? consists?of?visiting? at? each? time? step? as?
many?nodes? as?possible? in?order? to?minimize? the? time?
lag? between? two? visits? at? the? same? node.? ? Therefore,?
each?node?not?only? is?an?environment?point?of? interest?
to? be? inspected,? but? also? a? point? where? interaction?
among? agents? arises,? i.e.,? each? robot? in? graph? node? ?n N G? must? select,? based? on? other? robots? selections,?
an?appropriate?action? in?order? to? choose? the?next?node?
to? visit.? Taking? into? account? this? interaction,? normal?
form? games? at? each? graph? node ? ?n N G? have? been?
defined.?
?
Definition? 1? (Normal?Form?Game)?Formally,?a? finite?n?
robot?normal?form?game ? is?made?of:?
?? A?finite?setM of?robots i 1, ,n.? ? ?? A?finite?set 1 nA A A ,? ? ?? where ? ?1 ki i iA a , ,a? ? is?a?
finite? set? of? actions? for? robot i 1, ,n.? ? Each? vector? ? ? ?? ?1 nj j1 n 1, ,na a , ,a A j 1, ,k? ? ??? ? is? called? action?
profile? for? the? game .? Each? action? is? related? to? an?
edge ? ?e E G .? ?? A? finite? set 1 nS S S ,? ? ?? where ? ?1 ki i iS s , ,s? ? is? a?
finite?set?of?strategies? for? robot i 1, ,n.? ? Each?vector? ? ? ?? ?1 nj j1 n 1, ,ns s , ,s S j 1, ,k? ? ??? ? is? called? strategy?
profile?for?the?game .? A?strategy?is?the?criterion?taken?
into?account?to?determine?the?action?to?be?selected.?? A? payoff? function ? ?i s? ?? for? robot i 1, ,n,? ? ?
where S is?the?set?of?strategy?profiles.?? Therefore, ? ?i s? is?the?payoff?of?robot i when?strategy?
profile s is?chosen.?
?
In? this? implementation,? each? node ? ?n N G? has? a? fixed?
number? of? normal?form? games? which? depends? on? the?
edges? connected? to? it.? At? time? step? zero,? the? robots? are?
randomly?positioned?on?the?set ? ?N G . ??
Thus,? at? every? time? step,? the? robot i M? reaches? a? node? ?n N G? and?plays?its?corresponding?normal?form?game
.? As? a? consequence,? the? robot? chooses? its? individual?
strategy i
j
i is S? considering? the? strategies? selected? by? all?
other? robots.? The? action? related? to? the? strategy? chosen?
leads? the? robot? to? the?next?node.?Finally,? the? interaction?
among? robots? arises? when? each? robot? sends? a? message?
indicating? the? strategy? selected.? A? robot? can? select? an?
action?with?probability?one?or?by? randomizing?over? the?
set? of? available? actions? according? to? some? probability?
distribution.? Such? strategies? are? called? pure? and? mixed,?
respectively.?
?
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Definition? 2? (Pure? Strategy)? Given? a? set? of? available?
actions ? ?1 ki i iA a , ,a? ? for?robot i 1, ,n,? ? a?pure? strategy? ?? ? ? ?i 1l ji 1 i is a j 1, ,k ,l 1, ,k .? ? ?? ? Thus,?given?a?game ,?
a? pure? strategy? profile ? ? ? ?? ?1 nj j1 n 1, ,ns s , ,s j 1, ,k? ??? ? for?
the? game? is? the? joint? strategies? selection?where njns is? the?
choice?of?strategy nj by?robot n M? ??
Definition? 3? (Mixed? Strategy)? A? mixed? strategy i? for?
robot i 1, ,n? ? is? a? probability?distribution? over? the? set?
of? available? actions ? ?1 ki i iA a , ,a? ? for? such? robot;? i.e.,? a?
mixed? strategy? has? the? form ? ?1 1 k ki i i i ip a p a? ? ? ?? where? ?iji ip 0 j 1, ,k? ? ? and? i
i
jk
j 1 ip 1.?? ? ? Thus,? robot? i M?
selects? ijia ? with? probability? i
j
ip . ? If? ijip 0, j 1, ,k? ? ? ? ?
except? for?one,? say? ? ?ili ip 1,l 1, ,k ,? ? ? ? then? ? ? is?a?pure?
strategy.? Thus,? given? a? game? ,? ? a? mixed? strategy? profile? ?1 n, ,? ? ?? ? ? for? the? game? is? the? joint? selection? of?
strategies?where i? is?the?strategy?selected?by?robot? i M.? ?
?
A?manner? to? represent?a?game ? is? through? the?use?of? a?
n?×?n?matrix?payoff? game? in?which?each?cell?of?this?matrix?
indicates?a? strategy?profile?and? contains? the?outcome?or?
mixed? strategy?payoffs? of? the? game? when? such? profile? is?
selected.? Such? outcome? take? the? form? ? ? ?1 nC x,y , , ,x,y 1, ,n? ?? ?? ? ? where? the? entry? i? ? is?
the?payoff?of?robot? i M? ?
?
Definition?4?(Expected?payoff?of?a?mixed?strategy)?Given?
a? normal?form? game? ,? ? the? expected? payoff? for? robot
i M? playing? the? strategy? profile? for? the? game? ? ? ?1 nj j1 n 1, ,ns s , ,s , j 1, ,k? ??? ? is?defined?as?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?in ji i i i
a A i 1
s a Pr a j 1, ,k? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ???????(1)?
where? ? ?ijiPr a ? is? the? probability? that? action ij will? be?played?by?robot i M.? ?
?
Thus,? the? robots? that? interact? in? these? types? of? games?
choose? an? action? that? maximize? its? expected? payoff?
considering?the?actions?selected?by?all?other?robots.?This?is?
called? best? response? and? it? leads? to? the? central? solution?
concept?of?game? theory,? the?Nash? equilibrium.? From?now?
on,? the? robots? other? than? robot i M? are? specified? by? ?? ?i 1, ,i 1,i 1, ,n M .? ? ? ? ?? ? Moreover,? the? strategy?
profile?without? the? strategy?of? robot i M? is?defined?by?? ? ? ?? ?1 i 1 i 1 nj j j j1 1 i 1 i 1 n i 1, ,i 1,i 1, ,ns s , ,s ,s , ,s S j 1, ,k .? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
Definition? 5? (Best?Response)?The?best? response?of? robot
i M? to? the? strategy? profile 1s? is? a? strategy i is S?? such?
that ? ? ? ? ? ?iji i i i i i is ,s s ,s , j 1, ,k? ?? ? ?? ? ? for? all? strategies
ij
i is S .? ?
?
Definition? 6? (Nash? equilibrium)? A? strategy? profile? ? ? ?? ?1 nj j1 n 1, ,ns s , ,s j 1, ,k? ??? ? for? the? game ? is? a? Nash?
Equilibrium?if,?for?all?robots ijii M,s? is?a?best?response?to
is .? ?
?
In? the? games? played? in? this? implementation,? the? robots?
do?not?have?conflicting? interests?and? their?sole?challenge?
is?to?coordinate?on?actions?that?are?maximally?beneficial?to?
all.?These?types?of?games?are?called?team?games.??
?
Finally,? in? order? to? visit? as? many? nodes? of? a? graph? as?
possible,? a? set? of? robots? must? disperse? throughout? the?
environment.?Based?on? this?requirement,? the?payoffs?are?
defined? as? follow:? let? ? ?ji is? ? be? the? times? that? robots?
other? than? robot i M? select? the? strategy ? ?j 1, ,k ,? ?
where ? ?? ?j j j j ji 1 i 1 i 1 ns s , ,s ,s , ,s .? ? ?? ? ? Thus,? the? payoff? for?
robot i M? playing? such? strategy? is? defined? as? ? ? ?j j ji i i i is ,s M s .? ?? ?? ? Therefore,?the?payoff?is?low?when?
several? robots? choose? the? same? strategy.? Henceforth,? at?
each? time? step? that? a? robot i M? reaches? a? node? ?n N G ,? plays? a? normal?form? game ? against i M,? ?
chooses? an? available? action? of? its? set? of? actions iA and?
goes?to?the?next?node ? ?n N G .? ?
4.?Experience?weighted?attraction?learning?model?
In? the? Experience?Weighted? Attraction? or? EWA? learning?
model? each? strategy iji is S? has? a? numerical? value? called?
attraction,?which?specifies?the?probability?of?choosing?that?
strategy.? Each? attraction? has? an? initial? value,? which? is?
updated? each? period? through? the? use? of? two? rules? that?
update?two?variables.?The?first?variable ? ?iji t ,? correspond?
to?the?level?of?attraction?of?the?robot i M? by?the?strategy
ij
i is S? after? period t. The? second? variable ? ?t? represents?
the? amount? of? experience? and? indicates? the? number? of?
observation?equivalents? of? past? experience.? These?
variables?begin?with?some?prior?values,? ? ?0? and ? ?iji 0 .? ??
Thus,? the? first? rule? updates? the? level? of? attraction?
according?to?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?i i ii j j ji i i i iji t 1 t 1 1 S ,s t s t ,st t? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?(2)?
The?decay?rate? depreciates?previous?attraction ? ?iji t 1??
and? represents? a? combination? of? forgetting? and? level? of?
knowledge?about?the?adaptation?of?other?robots.?When?
4 Int J Adv Robotic Sy, 2013, Vol. 10, 181:2013 www.intechopen.com
?
is? lower,? old? attractions? are? decayed? more? quickly,?
whereas? the?most? recent?attractions?are?more? important.?
Moreover,? the? parameter? weights? hypothetical? payoffs?
that? unchosen? strategies? would? have? earned,? whereas? ?1 ?? weights?payoffs?received?from?the?chosen?strategy? ?ijis t . Finally,? the? indicator? function ? ?? ?iji iS ,s t? is? equal?
to?1?when?the?strategy?selected ? ?ijis t at?period t is?equal?to?
some? strategy? of? the? set? of? strategies iS .This? indicator?
function?is?utilized?in?all?the?models?of?this?section.?
?
The? second? rule? updates? the? amount? of? experience?
according?to?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?t 1 t 1 1,t 1? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????????(3)?
where ? ?1 ? ?? ? is? the?rate?of?decay? for?experience,?which?
measures? the? impact? of? previous? experience.?Moreover,?
the?parameter? specifies?how?quickly? robot i M? lock? in?
to? a? strategy.? When 0,? ? attractions? are? weighted?
averages?of?past?attractions?and?payoffs.?Past?attractions?
are? weighted? by ? ?? ?t 1 1 ,t 1 1? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ? whereas? payoffs? are?
weighted? by ? ?1 .t 1 1? ?? ? ? When 1? ? the? attractions?
cumulate?because ? ?t? becomes?one.?
?
The? initial? attraction? level? of? each? strategy iji is S? is?
denoted?by ? ?iji i
i
1
0 , j 1, ,k,
S
? ? ? ?? while?the?initial?value?
for?the?number?of?observation?equivalents ? ?0 1.? ? ?
?
Thus,? an? EWA? robot i M? using? these? rules? shapes? a?
set? of? attractions? which? specify?preference? for?a? specific?
strategy i
j
i is S .? Such? preference? is? given? as? a? choice?
probability ij
iP in? time? step t 1? through? a? logistic?
stochastic?response?function?defined?by?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?jiii jii
i
t
j
i
tk
j 1
e
P t 1
e
?
?
?
??
? ? ?
?
?
??????????????????????????(4) 
where ? is? the? response? sensitivity.? With 0? ? the? choice?
is?stochastic?while ? ? ? is?best?response.?
?
Beyond?these?rules,?specific?values?of ? ?0 ,? ? and ? reduce?
this?general?model? to? special? cases? such?as? reinforcement?
and?belief?based?models.?
4.1?Reinforcement?Model?
In? the? reinforcement? model? of? EWA,? every? time? step?
that? a? robot i M? reaches? a? graph? node ? ?n N G ,? it?
performs?three?steps.??In?the?first?step,?the?robot?selects?
one? of? the? strategies? available? at? such? node.? This?
selection? is? based? on? a? logistic? stochastic? response?
function?defined?by?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?jiii jii
i
R t
j
i
R tk
j 1
e
P t 1
e
?
?
?
??
? ? ? ?????????????????????????(5) 
where ? is?the?response?sensitivity.?With 0? ? the?choice?is?
stochastic,? whereas ? ? ? is? best? response.? The? response?
function i
j
iP specifies? the? selection? probability? of? the?
strategy i
j
is ??
Each? strategy ijis is? related? to? a? reinforcement? value ijiR .
When? this? reinforcement? value? is? updated,? its? related?
strategy? is? reinforced.? Thus,? in? the? second? step,? once? a?
strategy? is? selected,? only? this? strategy? is? reinforced? by?
previous?received?payoffs?according?to?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?i i i ij j j ji i i i i i iR t R t 1 S ,s t s t ,s? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ????(6)?
As?can?be?seen,?this?rule?is?the?result?of?setting?in?the?EWA?
model 0, 1,? ?? ? and ? ?0 1,? ? therefore ? ?t 1.? ? This? is?
the? simplest? form? of? cumulative? reinforcement.? When
0, 0? ?? ? and ? ? ? ?10 ,1? ?? ? EWA? model? becomes? a?
form?of?averaged?reinforcement?governed?by?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?i i i ij j j ji i i i i i iR t R t 1 1 S ,s t s t ,s? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?(7) 
where? reinforcements? are? averages? of? previous?
attractions? and? incremental? reinforcement.? The? initial?
reinforcement? value? of? the? strategies? available? at? each?
node?is?defined?by ? ?iji i
i
1
R 0 , j 1, ,k.
S
? ? ? ? ?
Finally,? in? the? last? step,? the? robot i M? communicates? the?
strategy?selected?to?the?other?robots,?so?that?they?update?the?
reinforcement? value? of? the? strategy? selected? by? the? robot
i M? in?the?node ? ?n N G .? Thus,?similar?to?the?behavior?of?
attractions? in? EWA? model,? in? the? reinforcement? case,? each?
robot?shapes?the?reinforcement?of?each?strategy?by?utilizing?
the? aforementioned? rules.? The? Algorithm? 1? describe? the?
three?steps?accomplished?in?this?model.?
? ?
? ?3
5
6 
7
j
j
j
:?M,N
1? ?n N G
2? ?j 1, ,k
1
R 0
S
4
(1)?Select?a?strategy?based?onP ;
8? (2)?Reinforce?the?strategy?selected?throughR ;
9 (3)?Communicate?the?strategy?selected?to?the?
??
?
?
Data
forall do
forall do
end
end
while  dotrue
other?robots i M;
10
? ?
end
?
Algorithm?1.?Algorithm?of?the?reinforcement?model?
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4.2?Belief?Based?Model?
Belief?based?models?start?with?the?premise?that?each?robot
i M? identifies? that? it? is? playing? a? game ?with? other?
robots,?and? it? forms?beliefs?about?what? these? robots?will?
play?in?the?future?based?on? its?past?observation.??Then,? it?
attempts?to?define?dynamic?processes?that? lead?to?a?Nash?
Equilibrium? by? choosing? a? best? response? strategy? that?
maximizes?its?expected?payoff?to?its?beliefs.?
?
There? are? different? iterative? learning? rules? to? form?
beliefs.? One? widely? used? model? of? learning? is? the?
process?of?Weighted?Fictitious?Play?and?its?variants,?such?as?
Cournot? Best?Response? Dynamics,? which? looks? back? only?
one?play,?as?opposed? to?Fictitious?Play?which? looks?back?
the tmost?recent?plays,? (Brown,?1951).? At?each? time?step?
in? the?model?of?Weighted?Fictitious?Play,?each? robot i M?
chooses? its? strategies? to? maximize? its? expected? payoff?
given?its?prediction?about?the?distribution?over?strategies?
of? other? robots? at? that? time? step.? Therefore,? Weighted?
Fictitious?Play? is? an? instance? of?model?based? learning? in?
which? a? robot? maintains? beliefs ? ?ti iB s? about? the?
strategies?of?other?robots i is S .? ?? In?the?prediction?of?this?
learning? rule,? the? initial? prior? belief? that? robot i M?
assigns?to?strategies is? of?robots i M? ? is?governed?by?
? ? ? ? ?? ?
i i
0
i i0
i i 0
s S i i
Y s
B s
Y s? ?
?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ????????????????????(8)?
where ? ?0i i iY s : S? ? ??? is? an? exogenous? initial? weight?
function,? which? assigns? a? real?value? to? each? strategy?of?
the? robots? other? than? robot i M.? This? value? is? assigned?
according? to? ? ? ? ?i i0i i i
i
S j 1
Y s : , j 1, ,k,
S
?? ?
? ? ? ? ? where
iS? represents? the? cardinality?of? the? set iS .? Later,?every?
time? step? that? the? strategy
is? is? played,? its? weight? is?
updated?according?to?
? ? ? ? ? t 1t t 1 i ii i i i t 1
i i
1 if?s s
Y s Y s
0 if?s s? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?
? ??? ? ? ? ?? ??????????(9) 
The? initial?weight?assigned? is?different? for?each? strategy.??
This?assignation?permits?that?the?updates?performed?by?9?
do? not? lead? to? weights? with? the? same? value,? which?
allows?to?avoid?selection?problems.?
?
The? belief? that? robot i M? assigns? to? the? robots i M? ?
playing is? at?time?step t is?given?by?
? ? ? ? ?? ?
i i
t
i it
i i t
s S i i
Y s
B s
Y s? ?
?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??????????????????(10) 
The? updating? rule? formulated? by? 10? can? be? defined? in?
terms?of?previous?period?beliefs?by?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?i i
i i
t 1
t t 1 i i
s S i i i i t 1
i it
i i t
s S i i
1 if?s s
Y s B s
0 if?s s
B s
Y s 1
?
?
? ?
? ?
?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?
? ??? ??? ? ? ?? ? ???? ? ??? ?? ?
?
? ?
(11)?
In? 11, ? ?ti iB s? is? expressed? in? terms? of? previous?period?
beliefs,? similar? to? EWA? model? with? previous?period?
attractions?and?reinforcement?model?with?previous?period?
reinforcements.?
?
Following? this?updating?rule,?most? recent?and?previous?
period? beliefs? are? updated? times.? When 0? ? Weighted?
Fictitious? Play? becomes? Cournot? Best?Response? Dynamics,?
and?when 1? ? it?becomes?Fictitious?Play.?Once?beliefs?are?
updated,?expected?payoff?of?robot i M? in?period ? ?ijti it,E s
is?defined?according?to?
? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?i i
i i
j jt t
i i i i i i
s S
E s s t ,s B s?
? ? ? ??? ??? ? ?????????????(12)?
As? in? the? case? of? beliefs,? expected? payoffs? can? be?
expressed? as? a? function? of? previous?period? expected?
payoffs?which?yields?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?i ii ii
i i
j jt t 1
s S i i i i i ijt
i i t 1
s S i i
Y s E s s t ,s
E s
Y s 1
? ??? ? ? ?
?? ? ??? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ??? ?? ?
?
?
?
? ?(13) 
Finally,? the? best? response? of? the? robot i M? in? Weighted?
Fictitious?Play?is?given?by?
? ? ?i
i
jt t
i i i
j
BR argmaxE s? ?????????????????????????(14)
 
5.?Experiments?and?result?
In? order? to? evaluate? and? compare? this? implementation?
with? other? methods,? a? patrolling? simulator? developed?
from?pioneers?works?(Machado?et?al.,?2003)?has?been?used.?
?
Thus,?the?first?experiments?aim?at?analyzing?the?behavior?of?
these?models?with? different? values? of? their? parameters,?
namely,? for? EWA? model ,? ? and ,? for? reinforcement?
model? and ,? and? for? belief?based? model .? In? order? to?
do? so,? the? map? shown? in? figure? 1(a)? was? used.? Where?
unfilled?small?circles?stand?for?nodes?or?points?of?interest,?
lines?stand?for?edges?of?a?graph?or?paths?that?robots?use?to?
move? throughout? the? map.? Filled? big? circles? stand? for?
robots?patrolling? such?map.? In? this?set?of?experiments,?a?
group?of?20?robots?started?at?node?number?22?and?patrol?
until?each?node?had?been?visited?256?times.?
?
?
?
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Figure?1.?Maps?used?in?order?to?evaluate?performance?of?each?algorithm?
?
Figure?2.?Performance?of?the?models?evaluated?utilizing?the?map?of?figure?1(a).?
Figure? 2? shows? the? performance? of? the? models?
evaluated.???At?each?plot,?color?intensity,?coordinates,?and?
box? plots? represent? the? total? idleness.? Thus,? figure? 2(a)?
shows?the?behavior?of?EWA?model?using?six?slice?planes?at?
the?axis? through?a?volumetric?data?created?with?values?
of 0 , , 1.0.? ? ?? ? As?it?can?be?seen,?the?best?behavior?was?
obtained? with? the? slice? at 0.2.? ? In? this? slice,? the?
volumetric? data? shows? that? the? idleness? is,? in? general,?
approximately? 2.5.?The? region? around? the?points 0.7? ?
and 0.9? ? presents? the? lowest? idleness,? whereas? the?
idleness?value?hardly?ever?reaches?values?of?2.55.? Figure?
2(b)? shows? a? surface? expressing? the? behavior? of? the?
reinforcement? model? for? values? of 0 , , 1.0.? ? ?? ? It?
shows? that? the? bigger? the? value? of? and? the? lower? the?
value? of ,? the? better? the? performance? of? the? model.?
Indeed,? the? surface? has? a? minimum? at? coordinate? ?0.9, 0.3 .? ?? ? In? general,
?
0.9? ? achieves? the? best?
behavior,? which? indicates? that? the? form? of? cumulative?
reinforcement? performs? better? than? the? average?
reinforcement.? In? the? form?of? cumulative? reinforcement,?
each? strategy? has? a? level? of? reinforcement,? which? is?
incremented? cumulatively? by? received? payoffs.? Finally,?
figure? 2(c)? shows? the? performance? of? the? belief?based?
model? for? values? of 0.0 1.0?? ? by? means? of? using? box?
plots.? The? size?of? each?box? represents? the? spread?of? the?
data,?whereas?the?symbols?“+”,? called?outliers,?are?values?
distant? from? the? rest? of? the?data.? ? For? security?purpose,?
it? is? not? suitable? to? have? several? outliers? because? they?
represent? nodes? with? high? idleness,? which? indicates?
points?of?weakness.? In?general,? the?nature?of? the?belief?
based? model? is? almost? the? same? in? all? cases.? When
0.1? ? the?median,?2.29,?of?the?data?is?the?smallest.? Even?
though,? the? smallest? median? does? not? mean? better?
performance,? the? size? of? the? box? when 0.1? ? is? lower?
than? the?other?options.? This? size? indicates? that? the? total?
idleness?of?all?nodes? is? similar.?Moreover,? there?are?only?
two?outliers,?at?nodes?28?and?40?with?total?idleness?of?5.22?
and?5.61,? respectively.? ?Although,? there?are?options?with?
two?or?less?outliers,?their?values?are?bigger.?Based?on?this?
information,? values? of 0.2, 0.9? ?? ? and 0.7? ? for? EWA?
model;
?
0.9? ? and 0.3? ? for? reinforcement? model,? and
0.1? ? for?belief?model?model?were?selected.?
?
Once?all?parameters?of? the?models?were?determined,?the?
next? experiments? aimed? at? evaluating? the? models? in?
comparison? to? other?methods?available? in? the?Patrolling?
Simulator,? namely,? the? Cycle? algorithm? and? the? MPS?
algorithm,?which?were?described? in? section?2.? ? For? these?
experiments,?all?the?maps?of?figure?1?were?used.?For?each?
map,?sets?M?of?6,?8,?10,?15,?20,?25,?30?robots?were?evaluated.??
This? combination? generates? 21? cases? of? study? to?
experiment.? ? Each? experiment? consists? of? visiting? all?
nodes? 256? times.? ? At? time t 0,? each? robot? was? placed?
randomly?at?one?node?of?the?map.?
?
Table? 1? shows? the? results? of? these? experiments? for?
Strongly?Connected,?Maze?and?Grid?maps.?In?these?results,?
the? lower? the?size?of ,? the?better? the?performance?of? the?
algorithm? and? the? lower? the? value? of ,? the? lower? the?
variance.? As? it? can? be? observed,? if? the? value? ofM
increases,? the? performance? of? all? of? the? algorithms? is?
better.? Although? this? behavior? seems? obvious,? if? the?
coordination? among? robots? is? not? appropriate,? bigger?
values? ofMwill? not? lead? to? better? performance? of? the?
algorithms.?Therefore,? this? nature? is?due? to? the? suitable?
coordination.?
?
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? Cycle? MPS? Belief?Based? Reinforcement EWA
Map? M? Total?Idleness??? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
?
C
o
n
n
ec
te
d
?
30? 1.711? 0.829? ? ? 1.663 0.649? 1.647? 0.614? 1.674 0.673
25? 2.006? 0.974? ? ? 1.904 0.655? 2.086? 1.109? 1.979 0.876
20? 2.471? 1.195? ? ? 2.445 1.151? 2.460? 1.173? 2.453 1.101
15? 2.981? 3.805? ? ? 3.066 2.672? 2.372? 2.923? 3.598 4.981
10? 5.119? 6.534? ? ? 3.941 5.090? 3.148? 2.640? 5.587 5.165
8? 4.225? 3.662? 5.889? 5.287? 4.912 4.095? 4.443? 4.714? 5.130 4.714
6? 8.139? 10.81? 6.783? 6.689? 8.474 9.503? 8.078? 10.47? 6.746 6.477
?
?
?
Maze?
30? 3.304? 1.604? ? ? 3.114 1.490? 3.240? 1.720? 3.264 1.639
25? 3.904? 1.895? ? ? 3.605 1.760? 3.884? 2.055? 3.940 1.996
20? 4.877? 2.361? ? ? 4.477 2.251? 4.689? 2.446? 4.931 2.489
15? 4.844? 4.101? ? ? 4.259 4.270? 7.153? 7.168? 6.896 7.019
10? 7.674? 7.737? ? ? 8.203 7.404? 6.865? 5.571? 6.008 9.869
8? 9.963? 8.524? ? ? 5.909 6.165? 9.437? 9.746? 9.926 10.24
6? 13.58? 11.56? ? ? 10.30 7.604? 19.72? 19.53? 18.64 27.91
?
?
?
Grid?
30? 0.921? 0.415? ? ? 0.881 0.155? 0.919? 0.274? 0.900 0.230
25? 1.064? 0.478? ? ? 1.034 0.286? 1.016? 0.231? 1.000 0.234
20? 1.319? 0.594? ? ? 1.218 0.252? 1.235? 0.299? 1.226 0.290
15? 1.279? 3.114? ? ? 1.649 1.335? 1.892? 1.312? 1.242 0.961
10? 2.080? 3.326? ? ? 2.027 1.967? 1.753? 1.705? 1.989 1.682
8? 2.514? 1.826? 2.110? 1.936? 2.020 2.087? 2.604? 1.743? 2.015 1.998
6? 2.883? 5.238? 2.947? 2.513? 1.843 1.471? 3.517? 2.479? 2.852 2.397
Table?1.?Performance?of?the?algorithms?with?a?different?size?ofM
in?each?map?
Apart? from? having? a? more? suitable? architecture? for?
security?purposes,?in?as?many?as?95%?of?cases?one?of?the?
methods? presented? in? this? work? improves? Cycle?
algorithm.? ? The? only? case? where? Cycle? algorithm?
performed? better? was? in? Strongly? Connected? map? with
M 8.? Most? notably,? these? results? indicate? that?
regardless? of? which? map? is? used,? in? all? cases,? at? least?
one?of?the?methods?presented?in?this?work?improves?MSP?
algorithm.??Taking?into?account?that?both?Cycle?and?MPS?
algorithms? use? a? centralized? and? explicit? coordinator?
scheme,? this? improvement? in?performance? is? significant.?
Finally,? in? 80%? of? cases? MPS? algorithm? does? not? work?
due?to?partitioning?problems.? Portugal?and?Rocha?(2010)?
describe?the?reasons?of?these?problems.?It?is?worth?noting?
that?the?proposed?solution?does?not?have?these?problems.?
6.?Conclusions?
Several? dynamic? and? distributed? collaborative? multi?
robot? approaches? for? security? applications? at? critical?
facilities? have? been? developed.? Thus,? a? team? of? robots?
endowed? with? patrolling? behaviors? based? on? learning?
models?from?game?theory?as?well?as?a?thorough?study?of?
such?models?in?the?context?of?the?patrolling?problem?has?
been? presented.? As? shown? in? section? 5,? a? significant?
improvement? in?performance?was?obtained?by?using? the?
proposed? methods? with? respect? to? Cycle? and? MPS?
algorithms.? Moreover,? the? distributed? characteristics? of?
these? models? offer? solutions? with? several? advantages,?
such? as? scalability,? modularity,? and? incremental?
expandability.? Furthermore,? the? behavior? of? the? robots?
patrolling? that? are? using? the? techniques? of? this?work? is?
non?deterministic,? which? is? suitable? for? security?
applications?due? to? the? fact? that? intelligent? intruders?can?
learn? patrolling? paths,? and? based? on? this? information,?
perform?attacks? to? the?protected? system.?The? evaluation?
to?support?this?claim?is?not?part?of?the?scope?of?this?work.?
However,?results? in? (Sak?and?Wainer,?2008)?demonstrate?
that?system?protection?based?on?not?static?solutions?is?less?
susceptible?to?be?attacked.?
?
Despite?the?good?performance?achieved?with? the?models?
implemented,? there? are? significant? remaining? questions?
for? future? research.? Firstly,? interference? among? robots?
arises?when?more?than?one?robot?utilizes? the?same?edge.??
In? order? to? avoid? this? interference,? it? is? necessary? to?
evaluate? if? the? edge? selected? is? used? or? not? by? other?
robots.? Future? research? consisting? of? studying? the?
behavior? of? these? methods? including? such? aspect? is?
necessary.?Secondly,?the?metric?of?the?patrolling?simulator?
to? evaluate? the? performance? of? the? algorithms? only?
includes? the? idleness?of? each?node,?however? it?does?not?
take? into?account?if?one?edge?connected?to?such?node?(in?
the?case?that?it?has?more?than?one)?is?used?or?not.?Thus,?an?
interesting? future? research? consisting? of? evaluating? the?
behavior? of? the? algorithms? including? such? a? restriction?
because? it? allows? to?have?a?more? secure?system.? Finally,?
even? though? the? expected? payoff? matrix? defined? has?
achieved?suitable?results,?new?definition?matrices?should?
be?explored.?
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